Big decisions for central bankers amidst the blood-letting......
Tuesday 25th August 2015
Big decisions for central bankers amidst the blood-letting......
All media outlets, everywhere.
We can take it as read that all will be aware of yesterday's crash
in world stock markets, when Shanghai's fall of 8.5% led other
markets across the globe to record their own eye-watering losses. We need
to remember the conditions in which events occurred. Markets always overreact,
and never more so than in times of panic-induced sell-offs. Moreover,
computer-driven trading decisions often ignore what might be seen as
common sense valuations and even thinner August liquidity only adds to the
problem. Nothing could illustrate the point better than yesterday's low tick on
the Dow Jones, down 1000 points on the opening before staging a partial recovery
to more realistic levels. Shanghai is down another 7.6% today but European
markets are higher, which might suggest that the panic has at least momentarily
abated, but of course the big question for investors is whether this is
developing into a fully-fledged crash or a manageable correction. The big
question for central bankers is what to do to ensure that it's the latter.
China's authorities are learning some harsh lessons. By common
consent, they've employed some pretty shrewd advisors to help them steer a
steady path since China became the prime engine for global growth,
but their inherently contradictory concept of
state-controlled capitalism has always looked flawed in the long
run. To say that recent policy now looks clumsy is an understatement. The plan
to positively encourage a stock market bubble (to allow corporate debt to be
converted into equity etc) was reckless. Then to believe that it was possible
to support a market under intense selling pressure for any length of time
through state intervention was naïve at best and now looks like a gross
miscalculation. China has ignored one of the most basic realities
-- YOU CAN'T BUCK THE MARKET -- probably in the
belief that the enormous resources at their disposal meant that they're not subject
to the normal rules. It looks now as though the view has been taken that the
cost of supporting the market is too high, and stocks have been abandoned
to find their own level. That's the trouble with intervention, or one of them
at least : if you set yourself up to defend a particular level, once that level
is breached there's hell to pay.
What steps can the People's Bank of China take now ? They don't
have all the courses of action open to them that other central banks have, but
further aggressive monetary easing is being called for. And therein lies the
dilemma : the PoBC is involved in another hugely expensive intervention
programme, that of supporting the value of the yuan from
"over-depreciation", ironically a situation created by the
PoBC's own move to engineer a (minor) devaluation on August 11th. Easier
monetary policy would plainly work directly against the efforts to defend
the currency, and something's got to give.
What about the US Federal Reserve, and its decision on when to
raise rates ? Hawks would remind us that the Fed's brief is a
domestic one, and that it is not their job to boost or even defend asset
prices. Therefore, the strength of the labour market and it's implications for
LONGER TERM inflation means that the Fed should still look to hike in
September. Maybe it's our turn to be naïve, but surely it's inconceivable that
the Fed will not pay attention to global markets in turmoil. Besides,
the accompanying crash in commodity prices (especially oil) makes inflation concerns
seem more than a little academic just now. Whatever the case, the futures
markets now suggest the probability of a September hike has dropped down to
just 24% (from (50%), and quite a few are even calling for the Fed to
wait until March next year.
One of the most interesting aspects of the lowering of
expectations of a rate rise in September has been the weakening effect it has
had on the US dollar. US$ / Euro has been above 1.16 -- it's only a
few weeks ago that we were at 1.08 and people were talking about parity.
Incidentally, a similar scenario can be seen in UK£ / Euro, and for much
the same reason. A weaker currency will be welcomed in both the US and the UK,
but if things don't reverse themselves pretty quickly what will be the effect
of a stronger Euro on the Eurozone economy as a whole ? Even with the
recent benefit of a weak currency, it's been struggling along at best.
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